Defining Dignity

I start describing the concept of dignity by reading the first sentence of the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR):

“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.

The UDHR affirms a common humanity and articulated dignity as a moral idea to guide politics and to protect the individual from the power of state. Not only the principle of dignity, the declaration of all human rights of the UDHR was intended to affirm universal moral principles for international politics based not on the authority of states but the value of human dignity (Hoover Joe. 2013. Rereading the universal declaration of human rights: plurality and contestation, not consensus. In: Journal of Human Rights. Volume 12, issue 2, 2013. 217-241. 227).

The UDHR does not define the concept of dignity. The use of the concept dignity by the UDHR hints at some famous descriptions of the term by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant insists that there is no price for dignity, there is no equivalent for dignity, there is no relative value for dignity, there is an inner value, and this is called dignity (Kant Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. ed. Karl Vorländer. 1965. Felix Meiner: Hamburg. 435.The page number refers to the edition of the Königlichen Preußischen Akademie of Kants gesammelte Schriften by Paul Menzer. Berlin 1903).

The possibility condition for dignity is not political. The possibility condition for dignity is morality, only a rational being can claim an end, only reason can give a legislation for an end in itself, that is dignity (ibid.). For Kant the subject of dignity is the whole of mankind at the condition that this mankind is capable of morality. If reason is not willing to follow a universal legislative principle - for example loyalty to a promise or the principle of benevolence -, then there is no morality, because there is no inner value (ibid.). It is important to note the difference: Kant uses the concept of dignity in the context of morality, the UDHR uses the concept of dignity for guiding international politics.

The UDHR uses in the context of dignity a concept that owes very much to Kant too, that is the concept of freedom. For Kant there is no dignity if there is no freedom of will (ibid. 440). We would say today, dignity is at least in part about choice. The Categorical Imperative tells us to treat humanity in each person never merely as a means, but always as an end in itself. Treating a person as a means is negating or suppressing the free will of a person. Treating a person as an end in itself is respecting the free will of the person. Treating a person as an end in itself concerns oneself and concerns all other persons, all other rational beings at whom my actions are directed (ibid. 428f.). Without freedom, without respecting the free will of the persons with whom I am dealing, there is no dignity. The UDHR claims the conjunction of dignity and freedom, just as Kant has demonstrated and claimed. Just as Kant, the UDHR claims also the conjunction of equality and dignity and the conjunction of equality and a human right. Kant claims not to use another person as instrument for realizing one’s own will, but to treat oneself as rational being as all other rational beings according to an end in oneself and themselves (ibd.). The second sentence of the first article of the UDHR reflects a little bit of Kant’s rational idealism and Christian moral understanding of dignity: “They (i.e., all human beings) are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”

Kant describes the practical principle of free will for acting according to the Categorical Imperative as a principle that qualifies as a universal law (ibid. 421). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares universal rights for all of mankind as guideline for international politics, Kant remains in the context of respect and morality. Kant claims that free will acting according to the principle of a universal legislation is the condition for respecting the dignity of all mankind, that is the dignity of every person (ibid. 440). He speaks of autonomy, autonomy of will is a will who becomes law by itself. The Categorical Imperative commands the principle of autonomy (ibid.). Kant is a realist. He acknowledges repeatedly that we are not only members of the intelligible world, but we are also members of the world of the senses. The desires of the senses affect my will and the idea of freedom that makes me a member of the intelligible world cannot act according to the autonomy of an idea of the free will if it is influenced by the senses and affects (ibid.454). Kant founds the legal entitlement of human reason to the freedom of will on the possible independence of reason from the senses (ibid. 457). He hopes for the realization of this entitlement to the right of freedom of will, he hopes for the intelligent use of reason that is independent from the affections and impressions of the senses. His tireless advocating for living according to the pure rational intelligence of the self does not blind him for the real and effective influences of the physical urges and sensual drives that he apparently views with a sense of understanding (ibid.).

Contemporary writers who are aware of Kant’s tradition, still doubt that the UDHR defines dignity as a legal right. Dignity became an absolute principle in the Basic Law for the German Federal Republic, but Bernhard Schlink, professor of law who had been justice of the Constitutional Court of a state of the German Federal Republic, doubts that dignity could contribute much to legal debates and appreciates “dignity” as a “functional concept ‘that encapsulates our yearning for a recognition and protection of humans’” (McCrudden, Christopher. 2013. “An Introduction to Current Debates”. In Understanding Human Dignity, edited by Christopher McCrudden. Proceedings of the British Academy 192, 1–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press.13). We would need this yearn though it regularly gets disappointed and “will never be fulfilled’ anyways” (ibid.).

Rights are legitimate claims held by individuals and individuals organized into groups, communities, or states; lawyers call rights “entitlements” (Gibson, John S. 1996. Dictionary of International Human Rights Law. The Scarecrow Press: London. vii). I speak of rights as legitimate claims that are expressed by women, men, and queer in speech-acts. Gibson is clear about the fact that “a right in a treaty is an ideal unless it is implemented as a law” (ibid. 15). On December 10, 1948, the United Nations proclaimed the UDHR. Implementation of human rights law by international conventions was realized in 1976 with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Ever since the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties was signed, a state has been obliged by its commitments in a human rights treaty to comply with the provisions of the treaty in good faith (Gibson 1996: 17).

In 1967 Article 2 (1) the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights inscribed the extensive responsibility of states “to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights in the present Covenant”. In 2023 the challenge remains to reflect and sustain the claim of the individual’s freedom and equality in dignity and rights, especially of those who are excluded from policymaking because of the lack of access, availability, and affordability of the necessary resources for their health condition, and social, economic, cultural, spiritual, or political life conditions on this planet (Amartya Sen. The idea of Justice. Penguin Books Ltd, London 2009. 39). Sen writes on justice on the basis of “assessments of social realizations, that is, on what actually happens” …. and “on comparative issues of enhancement of justice” (ibid. 410). Looking at the real-world Amartya Sen takes as a fact that the vote on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 is “an ethical assertion – not a proposition about what is already legally guaranteed” (ibid. 325).

In 2008 the United Nations officially claim that the UDHR generally is “agreed on to be the foundation of international human rights law” (http://www.un.org/en/events/humanrightsday/2008/ihrl.shtml). Sen is right to point at the fact that the UDHR is not yet established as a legally guaranteed law of rights and duties in the whole world. It is important to insist on an egalitarian view on justice and to focus with Sen on justice as assessments of social realizations, “that is, on what actually happens (rather than merely on the appraisal of institutions and arrangements)” (ibid. 410).

Despite the very serious shortcomings of the implementation of the UDHR as effective rule of law in this world, the UDHR speaks of concrete rights: Civil and political rights (right of assembly, right of petition to governance), legal rights (due process of law), economic (right to work), social (right to health) and cultural rights (right to take part in cultural life), collective rights (peoples’ right of self-determination), declaratory rights (right of development), and for all categories (right of nondiscrimination) (Gibson 1996: 7). The constitutional value of human dignity which is common to most constitutional rights of liberal democratic constitutions, serves to strengthen the unique constitutional value characterizing each specific right; this means, that each of the specific rights of a constitution constitutes one element of the description and realization of the term “human dignity” (Barak Aharon. 2013. “Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right.” In Understanding Human Dignity, edited by Christopher McCrudden. Proceedings of the British Academy 192, 359–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.365).

Article 30 of the UDHR proclaims that no interpretation of the UDHR must lead to a “destruction of any of the rights or freedoms” of the UDHR (http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/). The positive affirmation of the hermeneutic principle of indivisibility of the right of dignity and all the other rights of the UDHR we find in part one of the 1993 Vienna Declaration: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural system, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx).

Dignity is more than a mere principal of morality; it is a human right and the foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the world as we read in the Preamble of the UDHR:

“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world… Now, therefore, The General Assembly, Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction” (http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/).

In 1948 the UDHR proclaims that “every individual” and not only “every organ of society … promote respect for these rights” as the end of the Declaration (ibid). In order one day to be able to assess effective recognition and observance of the rule of Human Rights law we need the individual woman,man, and queer to teach and educate the promotion and respect of Human Rights on this world. The UDHR made the individual person, not just the states, subject of international law.

It is a matter of fact that I need to be part of a language community in order to express claims, in order to speak, in order to be understood. The grammar of claiming dignity and all other Human Rights, the grammar of claiming in general, is a function of a group and the operation of an individual. The function is part of language, and the operation is a speech-act. We need an institution like the United Nations that is able to proclaim the rights to dignity, equality and freedom. The claim of the United Nations to the rights that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” is a claim. This means that the United Nations claims the efforts “to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance”. Effective recognition and observance and all the other measures necessary to stand up to the Human Rights of the UDHR are operations of single women, men and queer persons, be they private persons or officials of democratic societies and institutions.

It is part of the grammar of rights that a person enjoys a right independently of her or his capability status. “This is the answer to the question if dignity is absent if the single woman, man, or queer person who does not dispose or does not any more dispose of the capability of claiming her or his dignity by speech-acts” (Leher P. Stephan. 2018. Dignity and Human Rights. Routledge: New York and London. 64). Persons who are not, not yet or not any more capable of expressing their dignity by claims and other speech acts enjoy equal rights and according to these rights are to be effectively respected in their dignity and protected by the observance of these rights by the United Nations and the democratic member nations that follow the rule of Human Rights law (ibid. 62).

Antonio Papisca, professor of Human Rights law rule at the United Nations and at the University of Padua, Italy, challenges those, both in West and East, who try to abolish the collective security system under the supranational authority of the United Nations (Papisca, Antonio. 2005. “Article 51 of the United Nations Charter: Exception or General Rule? The Nightmare of the Easy War.” Pace diritti umani – Peace Human Rights 2005 (1): 13–28. 22). Papisca claims the realization of “more direct legitimation of the UN institutions and more political (popular) participation in its decision-making process” and a reform of the UN (ibid. 23). Papsica champions “international-transnational democracy” and “the participation of civil society, transnational organizations and movements” to meet the needs of “the human family” and he proposes extending the Security Council membership to the European Union and the African Union (ibid. 24). The reform of the UN should give the Economic and Social Council equal status as the Security Council and “enforcement power” (ibid. 25). Papisca is right, we need a supranational authority under the command of the United Nations to make aggressive warfare impossible. When on February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, brutally attacked with his army the Republic of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people to force this brave people into submission by recklessly breaking International Law, there was no supranational authority on planet earth to stop him. Papisca’s claim for an authority under the command of the United Nations that is capable of making aggressive warfare like that of Vladimir Putin impossible, is of urgent actuality.