What characterizes a Council in the Roman Catholic Church?

Karl Rahner (1904-1984) – as most Roman Catholic theologians - is not concerned with the active participation of the one billion individual Catholic women, men and queer, the so-called “lay,” in the government of the Catholic Church (Rahner, Karl, and Herbert Vorgrimler. 1966. Kleines Konzilskompendium. Freiburg: Herder. 17). Rahner, one of the most influential Roman Catholic theologians of the 20th century, claims that the social structure of the Catholic Church is a hierarchical one and that it will stay a hierarchical order. Rahner holds that the hierarchy of the episcopate is justified but must not be identified with the life of the whole Church. The one and whole people of God, the body of Christ, lives, acts and suffers, loves, hopes, and believes with the help of the Holy Spirit in all its members and the support of the Holy Spirit is promised to the whole Church (ibid.). Rahner does not speak in the context of the body of Christ of the social realization of dignity, hope and love of the individual woman, man, and queer; there is no actual belief in the agency of empowered participation of the individual in the government of the Catholic Church. Rahner describes the Church as the community that comes from Jesus Christ and believes in Jesus Christ as her Lord. Every believer of the people of God hopes in Christ as the revelation in history and in the fulfilment of God’s love. Rahner refers to the third chapter of the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church, Lumen Gentium of the Second Vatican Council, as the origin of the above description (ibid. 13). Following this description, Lumen Gentium defines the hierarchic constitution of the Roman Catholic Church and the functioning of its government by the whole episcopate of the Church with and under the Pope as the first of the Twelve, who Jesus assembled as his Church and to whom he entrusted her leadership and government (ibid. 14). It did not come to Rahner’s mind that offices, bishops and governmental structures were introduced successively in the second century CE and not in the first century.

Rahner identifies an ecumenical council as the highest institution of the Roman Catholic Church. An ecumenical council is the collegial act of assembly of the whole episcopate together with and under the authority of the Pope, that discusses and decides on matters of the Church (ibid. 16). Catholics recognize decisions made by this highest office of the Church as infallible under the condition that this highest office decided on a matter concerning confession of the belief in Christ that concerns the whole confession of the Church (ibid. 15). Rahner recognizes without protest and some understanding that according to the constitution of a council the lay women, men, and queer of the Catholic Church – the priests are not even mentioned – are not permitted to participate in a council as active discussing, deciding, and voting members (ibid. 23).

In 1966 Rahner’s description of the social institution of an ecumenical council of the Roman Catholic Church, that is a collegial act of the assembly of the whole episcopate together with and under the authority of the Pope, corresponds with the general consensus for this description and with the understanding of an ecumenical council within the Roman Catholic Church. When reflecting on the meaning of and the purpose that an ecumenical council serves, the historian Günther Wassilowsky feels the need to find the roots of this institution of an ecumenical council and turns to the Gospel (Wassilowsky, Günther. 2014. “Das II. Vatikanische Konzil als Symbolereignis.” In Zweites Vatikanisches Konzil. Programmatik—Rezeption—Vision, edited by Christoph Böttigheimer, Quaestiones Disputatae 261, 180–200. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder. 184). All theologians started describing their very differing theories on the institutions of a synod or a council by referring to Mathew 18:19–20. This is true for the first Christian Latin author Tertullian (150-220 CE) in the early third century, for the Augustinian theologian, bishop and cardinal Aegidius of Viterbo (1496-1532), just as for Hans Küng in the twentieth century. “In truth I tell you once again, if two of you on earth agree to ask anything at all, it will be granted to you by my Father in heaven. For where two or three meet in my name, I am there among them” (Mathew 18:19–20). Where some persons gather in the name of God, God’s presence among them constitutes the promise that generated the history of Church councils (ibid.). The criteria for assessing God’s presence in a synod are consensus and unanimity of the gathered, and consensus and unanimity are also the consequence of a synod gathering in the Holy Spirit (ibid.). Yves Congar documented the reception and use of Mathew 18:19 - 20 by Church tradition throughout the Church’s history, developing his theology of a synod and council as an expression of the communion of the Church in the Holy Spirit (ibid.).

Since the term “communion” is important for the ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council, we must take note of the research conducted by Hermann Josef Sieben that discovers the use of the term by the German Prince-Abbot of Saint Blaise’s Abbey Martin Gerbert (1720-1793) (Sieben, Hermann Josef. 1992. “Consensus, unanimitas und maior pars auf Konzilien, von der Alten Kirche bis zum Ersten Vatikanum.” Theologie und Philosophie 67 (2): 192–219. Freiburg: Herder). Gerbert uses the term “communion” in the context of the discussion of the necessity of the “consensus” for obtaining a legitimate definition at a Catholic council (ibid. 210). Taking the historic example of the Apostolic Council that is the Council of Jerusalem (Acts of the Apostles, Chapter 15), Gerbert claims that both sides, the Pope and the bishops, need to consent, need to be in communion, need to work together toward a consensus in a council (ibid.). At the First Vatican Council the theologian Francisco Sborgi did not recognize Acts 15:25 as proof of the need for unanimity for the consensus of the council (ibid. 220). Despite all polarization in the nineteenth century, Sieben insists that the definition of the consensus must stay at the center of the definition of a council since the beginnings of the old Church and her councils (ibid. 192). When studying the history of this definition of a council Sieben considers two additional terms: unanimitas and maior pars, or in English unanimity and majority (ibid.). In the days of Cyprian of Carthage, namely in the third century CE, a council was understood as an event that had the function to create consensus (ibid. 193). The Council of Nicaea in CE 325 condemned the Arians as heretics with the “consent of all” (in Latin: adsensu omnium), that is using the truth criteria of the philosophers of Antiquity known as consensus omnium (ibid. 194). The Gallic monk and theologian Vincent of Lérins, who died around CE 445, speaks of a vertical and a horizontal consensus of a council. The vertical consensus refers to the definitions of the past councils and the horizontal consensus is the consensus that is created at the actual council (in Latin: consensio antiquitatis et universitatis) (ibid.). Vincent and the theologians of the old Church attribute this double consent to the working of the Holy Spirit (ibid.). The decisions of the council are therefore seen as inspirations received from God’s Spirit (ibid.). Already Origen (185-253 CE) spoke of this working of the Holy Spirit that causes unanimity of faith as the possibility condition of the presence of Christ in the assembly of the faithful and at a council (ibid. 195). In the fourth century and increasingly in the following centuries the practice of the principle of majority - already in use in the secular sphere - is adopted by the official Church. It follows the classical legal fiction of Roman law that the decision of the majority counts as the decision of the whole deciding body (ibid. 196). The legal construction of the sanior pars (sounder part), that is a minority that has the right to overrule the majority on the justification of convincing arguments and the extraordinary qualification of the personalities of the minority, was originally created within the Church (ibid.). William of Ockham (1288-1347) claims that a single no vote at a council causes the impossibility of consensus of the universal Church (in Latin: ecclesia universalis) (ibid. 197). This is because the question of the liberty and freedom of the decision of the individual person come to the attention of the Franciscan theologians. If Unanimitas or majority or sounder part, for centuries it was clear that it is the consensus that defines a council (ibid. 198). On the basis of the concept of consensus Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) developed not only the concept of a council and the Church, but also the concept of civil society and the state (ibid. 198). A council is an event where consensus is generated and consensus takes place, a council is the realization of social choices, deliberations, and generation of knowledge. In 1431 the Council of Basel discussed the problems of the consent of all with regard to a minority that claimed to possess the sounder part. Who was right? The majority, the minority, the Pope? John of Segovia, the theologian from the University of Salamanca and historian of the Council of Basel, claimed that the sounder part argument voiced by the minority is not valid, because the majority received more than two-thirds of the vote (ibid. 202). We see that the question of consensus at the council is increasingly decided based on the majority of votes. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Italian juridical expert on councils, Cardinal Dominic Jacubazzi, claimed that the majority of a council may decide not only questions concerning moral matters, but also questions of faith. The concept of unanimity is not even mentioned in the cardinal’s considerations. From the Council of Trent to the First Vatican Council a terrible polarization develops. One side asserts that consent does not matter with regard to the Pope, because the Pope is infallible anyway. The other side claims that consensus and unanimity are important. The Jansenists claim consensus based on unanimity and all talk of a majority is considered to contradict unanimity (bid.: 208). The French Gallicans insist on the independence of the local Church. In 1667 Louis de Thomassin suggests a compromise between papal infallibility and consensus on the basis of the old concept of horizontal and vertical consent (consensio antiquitatis et universitatis) of Lérins and with Nicholas of Cues understands the Church as the consensus of a council and a council as the assembly of the Church (ibid.). In 1786 the Synod of Pistoia, that was to reform the Tuscan Church, tried to secure a two-thirds majority vote by restricting the freedom of voters like simple pastors, who were not able to confront the arguments of professional theologians. The parish priest Fabricio Cellesi protested against this restriction on the freedom of expression, was disciplined by the Council’s authorities for his audacity, but his argument on the possibility condition of freedom for the social choice of a vote at a council had to be taken into consideration by the theologians (ibid. 219). As advocate for the freedom of the individual voter and for a council that is able to operate consensus to realize social choices, Sieben uses Emile Ollivier, an objective witness to the events at the First Vatican Council (ibid. 228). To secure the freedom of the individual voter and the functioning of a council Ollivier defends the principle of the majority over the principle of unanimity (ibid. 229). He defends his decision as being in line with Vincent of Lérins’ standpoint and makes reference to a fact of history in the development of the Church. If the Church had given in on the minority votes, the whole Credo of the Church would have fallen apart, because every single article of the Credo was severely contested by a minority (ibid. 229).

The Second Vatican Council convened and was a legitimate synod of bishops under Canon Law, because the Pope decided to convoke a council. The fact that the Second Vatican Council did not touch or change the decision of the First Vatican Council on the Dogmatic Constitution Pastor Aeternus, that was passed on July 18, 1870, is not commented by Rahner. Pastor Aeternus ruled that the Pope as the successor to Peter, as Vicar of Christ and supreme head of the Church, exercises the full and ordinary immediate episcopal power over the whole Church and the individual dioceses that is the primacy over the universal episcopacy. This power includes matters of faith, morals, discipline, and Church government. Pastor Aeternus further governs the infallibility and unchanging nature of a decision made by the Pope in matters of faith and morals that concern the whole Church without the need for its consent (ibid. 345).